As_]ean-Philippe suggests in liis sketch of my account of Hegel’s concept of recognition, Hegel doesn’t think of seltireflection as basically achieved by "stepping back" and viewing one’s ideas from a type of metaperspective. Rather, reylconsciousness comes primarily via engagement with anothen differently located subject. (If I had a badge slogan for this, it might read “Othen not Meta”.) Vhile at a theoretical level I’ve held to a dialogical model of philosophizing for a considerable time, it is in contexts such as these that one gets a deeper sense of just how dependent on dialogical engagement any thinking actually is. There is too much in what my four interlocutors liave said to respond adequately here to all points, but I’ll try to pick up on what strike me as important issues. I’ll reply to each in turn, but each reply will address issues tliat overflow the boundaries between separating them.